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Most production processes create by-products as 
well as the intended product. Some of these by-prod-
ucts have value (e.g., distiller dried grains, a by-product 
of ethanol production, have value as a livestock feed); 
others are considered waste and entail an expense for 
their disposal. Frequently the least expensive way to 
dispose of by-products has been to release them into 
the environment. Examples include the emissions of 
sulfur and particulate matter into the air when burning 
coal to create electricity and the introduction of chemi-
cals into rivers through sewer systems.
Pollution abatement
When a by-product is found to have a negative 
consequence in the environment, it is considered a 
pollutant (sometimes called in economic terms a nega-
tive externality, a production cost that producers pass 
on to society). Reducing the amount of the pollutant 
is deemed necessary to improve or preserve envi-
ronmental quality. When the government decides to 
reduce the quantity of pollutant released into the envi-
ronment they have several different tools from which 
to choose.
Historically, the pollution prevention tool that 
has been most often used is performance standards 
achieved through advances in technology. An example 
of performance standards is the government-man-
dated automotive fuel efficiency standards that were 
initiated in the 1970s and are still being increased.
A second pollution-prevention tool has been 
the imposition of pollution taxes. The government 
imposes a per-unit-of-pollution tax on companies and 
other entities that release pollutants into the environ-
ment. Because this tax increases the cost of providing 
goods and services, the taxed business has incentive to 
reduce its level of pollution. At the time that the tax is 
imposed, the level of reduction of pollution is uncer-
tain, but theoretically a reduction should occur. Part of 
the justification of the tax is that it will provide revenue 
to assist in cleaning up the environment. An example 
of a pollution tax is the per-kilowatt-hour tax that the 
city of Boulder, Colorado, imposes on electricity use 
because of its related greenhouse gas emissions.
A third, more recent, pollution-prevention tool is 
emissions trading through a so-called cap-and-trade 
system. Under a cap-and-trade system, the govern-
ment imposes a cap on the amount of pollutant that 
is allowed to be released and then either gives or auc-
tions off the right to emit the pollutant through a mar-
ket where polluters trade their allowances in the hope 
of reducing the cost of complying with the regulation. 
In the United States, a cap-and-trade system was suc-
cessfully implemented in the 1990s to combat acid rain 
by decreasing the amount of sulfur dioxide released 
when burning coal to generate electricity.
This publication introduces the principles of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) cap-and-trade systems used 
as a way of decreasing greenhouse gas emissions. It 
provides a basic introduction to cap-and-trade policies 
and discusses current markets for emissions trading of 
GHGs. It specifically addresses the potential agricul-
tural involvement in a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade 
system.
Emissions trading
The idea behind a cap-and-trade system is that pol-
lution reductions will occur at the least possible cost 
because polluters can choose how to reduce their level 
of emissions. If it is cheaper for them to institute activi-
ties or build facilities that reduce their emissions, they 
will do that. But if it is cheaper for them to pay some 
other company to reduce its emissions, then they can 
use those reductions to satisfy the government mandate 
for reduced emissions. Government regulations specify 
the acceptable level of emissions; the market determines 
the most efficient way of obtaining that level.
This discussion of cap-and-trade centers on the 
participants in the GHG market. By understanding 
different participants, we can begin to understand 
the potential impact that a cap-and-trade system can 
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have on agriculture. The participants discussed are (1) 
government, (2) sources of capped GHG emissions, 
(3) entities that are able to provide offsets for capped 
emissions, (4) other interested parties and (5) the mar-
ket. Each of the following sections illustrates the range 
of options that have been chosen by different govern-
ments in trying to reduce GHG emissions.
A summary of terms used within a cap-and-trade 
system should help with the discussion. The govern-
ment determines what the total allowable emissions 
for the region are and usually requires certain sources 
to reduce their emissions by a certain amount in order 
to meet the goal. In this way, each polluting entity is 
given an “allowance.” If any entity emits less than its 
allowance, it generates “surplus allowances” or “cred-
its” that can be sold to other entities that want them, 
usually because they are not able to emit less than 
their allowances. Certain entities that are not subject 
to a GHG cap create “offsets” by engaging in activities 
that either destroy or sequester GHG or that generate 
energy without emitting any GHG. These offsets can 
be traded like credits to entities that want them. Both 
offsets and credits are usually measured in metric tons 
of “CO2 equivalent” (CO2 Eq. or CO2e). Carbon diox-
ide is not the only greenhouse gas emitted, but all oth-
ers are translated into their global warming potential 
relative to CO2 before trading on the exchange. A CO2 
Eq. is the 100-year global warming potential of various 
GHGs as established by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC).
Government
This section refers to the Safe Climate Act of 2009. 
President Obama has endorsed this bill in principle, 
and as of mid-June 2009 it is progressing through the 
U.S. House of Representatives. Though it is not cur-
rently law and will undoubtedly change from its cur-
rent form, it is discussed here as the most likely U.S. 
government program to address GHG emissions.
Several levels of government are involved in GHG 
emissions regulation. Some local governments (e.g., 
Boulder, Colorado, and Fargo, North Dakota) or state 
governments (e.g., Illinois) have voluntarily agreed to 
subject themselves to a cap on GHG emissions associ-
ated with conducting city and state government activi-
ties. Several states in the northeastern United States 
joined together to form the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, which has instituted a cap-and-trade sys-
tem on electric companies. The European Union has 
instituted a cap-and-trade system on major GHG emis-
sion sources in accordance with an international treaty 
called the Kyoto Protocol.
The above list of government actions reveals that 
different levels of government can be involved in the 
reduction of GHG emissions. However, since the envi-
ronmental hazard of concern is global climate change, 
success requires that most, if not all, of the governments 
of the world collaborate to reduce GHG emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty devel-
oped in 1997 with the goal of reducing GHG emissions. 
The protocol calls for developed nations to cut their 
GHG emissions relative to a 1990 baseline. Developing 
nations are not called upon to reduce their GHG emis-
sions. The United States is the only major industrial 
nation that has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Two 
major objections to the Kyoto protocol that have pre-
vented the U.S. Senate from ratifying it are (1) it would 
impose significant costs on the U.S. economy, and (2) 
it would not work, because major polluting countries 
(specifically China and India) are not limited in their 
emissions. A corollary concern is that countries not sub-
ject to a cap can produce goods less expensively than 
those that operate under the cap; therefore, agreeing 
to the Kyoto Protocol would affect trade and employ-
ment in the United States. 
The Kyoto Protocol calls for the United States to 
reduce its emissions by 7 percent from its 1990 levels. 
The EU is to reduce emissions by 8 percent from their 
1990 levels. The Safe Climate Act of 2009 is proposing 
that emissions be reduced to 17 percent of 2005 levels 
by the year 2050. The table below shows the interme-
diate target emissions and how they relate to the 1990 
emissions. If the Safe Climate Act of 2009 becomes law, 
the United States will comply with the Kyoto Protocol 
in the year 2020.
Year standard 
to be met
Safe Climate Act of 2009
Emissions as a percent 
of 2005 level
Emissions as a percent 
of 1990 level
2012 97% 113%
2020 80% 93%
2030 58% 67%
2050 17% 20%
Should the U.S. government decide to regulate 
GHG emissions, it must make the following decisions 
that will be crucial to the operation of the program: (1) 
what will be the target reductions and by what year 
will they be reached; (2) which entities will have a 
cap, or limit, on the amount of GHG they can emit; (3) 
how will they allocate the permitted quantity of GHG 
emissions; (4) which entities will be allowed to pro-
vide GHG credits or offsets; (5) what limits are placed 
on offset providers; and (6) where will the market be 
conducted? Intense lobbying will occur to make sure 
that these questions and others are answered in ways 
that benefit the particular interest group lobbying the 
government. 
Sources of capped GHG emissions
When a government decides to regulate pollution, 
it determines what type and size of polluting entity will 
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be subject to the regulations. Though there are several 
sources of GHG emissions, the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI and other markets are discussed 
below) decided to regulate only electric power plants; 
the European Union Emission Trading System (EU 
ETS) regulates power generation and energy-intensive 
manufacturing. The U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) released a proposed GHG reporting rule 
in 2009 in which they indicated that the regulations 
would cover entities that emit more than 25,000 metric 
tons of CO2 Eq. annually. (Note that this is a reporting 
mandate, not an emissions cap). Polluting entities dis-
charging less than 25,000 tons of CO2 Eq. annually are 
not subject to the reporting regulation. The decision 
of which entity to regulate often comes down to some 
type of cost-benefit decision, such as which polluters 
emit enough pollutants to warrant the cost of reducing 
the pollution and of enforcing the regulation.
The EPA has historical estimates of the amount of 
GHG emissions produced by various sectors. Published 
EPA inventories indicate key categories as sources that 
have significant levels of emissions or whose emissions 
are trending upward. Figure 1 shows the key categories 
and emission levels in 2006. This information provides 
insight into which sources are likely to be subject to an 
emissions cap.
The designation of which sources will be capped 
is a political decision that is likely to include a cost-
benefit analysis. For example, the EPA has indicated 
that manure management (key category 16 in Fig-
ure 1) needs to report its emissions annually but that 
enteric fermentation (methane production during ani-
mal digestion; key category 7 in Figure 1) does not. 
Enteric fermentation is a larger source of emissions 
than manure management, but the cost of reporting 
emissions on livestock enteric fermentation is more 
problematic than the cost of reporting emissions on 
livestock manure management.
It is likely that the only cap that can be easily 
applied to agriculture is on manure management. 
Manure management is more easily capped than other 
agricultural sources of GHG because it is a point source 
of pollution, meaning that it is easy to locate the exact 
source of emissions. Both direct and indirect emissions 
resulting from application of nitrogen fertilizers are 
nonpoint sources of pollution. Nonpoint sources are 
more difficult to regulate than point sources. Though 
each pound of fertilizer applied to cropland has the 
potential to be a pollutant, not every pound actually 
becomes a pollutant. Release of GHGs from fertilizers 
is dependent on factors such as weather and growing 
conditions after the fertilizer is applied. A more likely 
way to reduce fertilizer emissions is to limit the GHG 
emissions from fertilizer manufacturers. Any costs 
they incur to reduce GHG emissions would be added 
to the cost farmers pay for the fertilizers.
Offset providers
In most cap-and-trade scenarios, all entities that 
are subject to a cap on their emissions are also allowed 
to sell credits — any emissions that are below their 
allowance. Some entities that are not subject to a cap 
are permitted by the government to provide offsets for 
the market. Usually, the quantity of credits supplied by 
uncapped entities is limited to a percentage of the total 
allowable emissions. For example, the RGGI limits the 
use of such credits to 3.3 percent of the allowance of the 
regulated electric companies.
Figure 1. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency listed 17 categories of greenhouse gas emissions in 2007. Agricultural 
emissions (black bars 6, 7, 16 and 17) totaled an estimated 391 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent in 2007.
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2009. Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2007.
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Many nonpolluting entities, such as wind and solar 
electric power generators, are allowed to supply credits 
to the market. The rationale behind their involvement 
is that the more electricity generated from sources that 
emit no CO2, the less electricity will be demanded from 
other sources and therefore a reduction of CO2 occurs. 
Electricity from wind and solar electric power genera-
tion frequently is more expensive than electricity gen-
erated by combusting hydrocarbons. By allowing the 
wind and solar generators to sell carbon credits, they 
are able to offset some costs and become more com-
petitive with other sources of electricity.
Afforestation projects are another nonpolluting 
source of carbon offsets that are occasionally permit-
ted to supply credits to polluting entities needing cred-
its. As trees grow they sequester, or permanently store, 
carbon that was in the atmosphere. Because trees take 
carbon out of the air, this is viewed as a negative emis-
sion and this amount can be sold to those who must 
reduce their emissions.
Another, more controversial, source of credits 
is polluting entities that are not subject to the cap. 
Because it is unclear which sources will be subject to 
the cap, it is unknown ahead of time which sources 
will be permitted to sell credits. But the RGGI provides 
an example of landfill and manure management being 
allowed to supply offsets. Landfills and manure stor-
age structures emit methane, a GHG. Since the RGGI 
caps only electric power plants, landfills and manure 
sources are not subject to a cap. However, landfills and 
manure sources that are able to capture their methane 
emissions and prevent them from entering the envi-
ronment are allowed to provide a credit that the elec-
tric power plants can use should they need credits to 
meet their cap. 
Credits can also come from entities operating out-
side the border of the country. Because the U.S. gov-
ernment does not have the authority to regulate GHG 
emissions in other countries, by definition, all GHG 
sources outside the United States are not subject to a 
cap. However, CO2 is a global pollutant so it really does 
not matter where the reductions occur. Any reductions 
in emissions anywhere on the globe have the same 
impact as reductions that occur within the border of 
the limiting country. The European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS) provides an example of a 
government that caps emissions within its jurisdiction 
and permits credits from GHG reduction outside of 
its jurisdiction. The rationale behind this is that many 
lesser-developed countries are not subject to the caps 
associated with the Kyoto Protocol. One way of help-
ing other countries to develop clean energy is to allow 
them to provide credits into the trading system of 
countries subject to a cap.
In order for an offset to contribute to the goal of 
reducing GHG in the environment, it must be (1) per-
manent, (2) additional, (3) verifiable and (4) enforce-
able. Permanent means that the GHGs sequestered or 
destroyed are not later released into the environment. 
Additional means that the GHG reductions from the 
offset project would not have occurred if the cap-and-
trade system had not encouraged it. Verifiable offsets 
are those that can be measured or can be shown with 
a high degree of confidence to offset GHG emissions. 
Enforceable means that suppliers of the offsets is legally 
liable if they fail to deliver the offsets. 
Other interested parties
Several entities not subject to a cap or able to supply 
offsets are also interested in GHG cap-and-trade sys-
tems. The most obvious interested parties are environ-
mental advocates who believe that GHGs are a signifi-
cant environmental hazard. They will lobby for what 
they believe to be the most efficient system with little 
concern for the cost to those entities that are required 
to reduce emissions. Should a cap-and-trade system 
be created, environmentalists also have the opportu-
nity to purchase emission allowances and credits in an 
effort to bring emissions down lower than the govern-
ment has dictated. Several projects allow people to buy 
carbon credits now for the emissions they incur when 
traveling by air or heating their home.
Another interested party is liquidity providers, 
frequently financial institutions. As with any market, 
there is a need for financing trades and there are busi-
nesses that seek to profit from those trades. Within 
existing GHG markets, there is a group of businesses 
that provide liquidity to the market by buying and 
selling credits solely for the purpose of trading them. 
These businesses never actually use the credits because 
they are not subject to any cap on GHG emissions.
As agriculture participates in providing offsets, it 
will become an enterprise that is likely to be insured. 
Insurance companies might be interested to the extent 
that carbon sequestration becomes an insurable activ-
ity. Undoubtedly this would happen in forest projects, 
where there is a risk that forest fire could destroy years 
of accumulated carbon.
Other, less obvious interested parties are those 
who are indirectly affected by a cap-and-trade sys-
tem. If significant government resources are devoted 
to GHG reductions, then fewer resources are available 
for other programs. For example, developing countries 
that receive extensive U.S. aid might be opposed to the 
U.S. government channeling its resources away from 
medical or nutritional aid to GHG reductions.
The market
The following summary of several existing GHG 
markets illustrates how the market might develop if 
the United States institutes a mandatory cap-and-trade 
system. A summary of key points is found in Table 1.
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Chicago Climate Exchange
Trading on the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is 
based on a voluntary cap-and-trade system for GHGs 
emitted in North America. As with all markets, there 
are “buyers” and “sellers,” or trading entities with dif-
ferent objectives. In the CCX, there are six membership 
categories. Members and associate members are busi-
nesses that agree to reduce their direct or indirect GHG 
emissions, or both. Offset providers and offset aggre-
gators manage projects or aggregate many projects that 
sequester, destroy or reduce GHG emissions. Liquidity 
providers and exchange participants are entities that 
trade for some purpose other than meeting a reduc-
tions target or providing an offset.
Though participation in the market by members, 
associate members, offset providers and offset aggre-
gators is voluntary, their involvement becomes legally 
binding when they agree to participate. Emitting mem-
bers must meet GHG emission reduction targets each 
year. Offsetting members must provide the offsets they 
have agreed to deliver.
The CCX targeted reduction is for emissions to be 
6 percent below their baseline, defined as their aver-
age annual emissions from 1998 to 2002 or the single 
year of 2000, by the year 2010. Because involvement is 
voluntary, the allowances cost the emitting members 
nothing. They must decrease their emissions without 
having to pay for the privilege of emitting anything 
below the baseline. In mandatory markets such as 
RGGI and EU ETS, emitting entities must acquire their 
allowances either by purchasing them or by the gov-
ernment distributing them for free.
Members who exceed their emissions reduction 
target in any single year can bank the excess reductions, 
called surplus allowances or credits, they achieved for 
use at a later time or can sell their credits to members 
who need them to meet their obligation. Members who 
do not meet their emissions reduction schedule must 
purchase credits or offsets. 
Trading of allowances is done with a contract, 
called a carbon financial instrument (CFI), which rep-
resents 100 metric tons of CO2 Eq. Of particular interest 
to agriculture is methane, which the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has determined to 
have 21 times the global warming potential of CO2 and 
therefore has a CO2 Eq. of 21, and nitrous oxide (asso-
ciated with fertilizers), which has a CO2 Eq. of 310. The 
CCX assigns methane a CO2 Eq. of 18.25 rather than 
its IPCC estimate of 21. This discounting of the value 
of methane, from 21 times that of CO2 to 18.25 times 
that value, is a way of recognizing the uncertain quan-
tity and quality of GHG reductions provided by offset 
providers.
Contracts are assigned a vintage corresponding to 
the year in which the reduction in GHG occurred. Vin-
tages facilitate trading by allowing businesses to carry 
forward credits from a previous year and use it as an 
offset in a future year. Contracts with earlier vintages 
can be used to meet later year obligations but cannot 
be used to satisfy obligations incurred in a previous 
year. For example, a 2008 vintage contract can be used 
to satisfy a 2009 obligation but cannot be used to sat-
isfy a 2007 obligation.
Each contract is traded in an open market. Con-
tracts of different vintages can have different prices 
depending on the supply and demand for each par-
ticular vintage. If an entity needing an offset thinks 
that the price of future offsets is going to be higher 
than they are today, that entity can purchase offsets for 
future obligations.
Market information is provided in a form similar 
to other commodity trades. Daily trading volume and 
high, low and closing prices for CFIs of various vin-
tages are reported on the CCX Web site ( chicagoclimatex.
com) in chart and tabular form. As of mid-June 2009, 
the price of CFIs has varied from $.71/metric ton of 
CO2 Eq. (February 2004 trade on a 2005 vintage con-
tract) to $7.40/metric ton of CO2 Eq. (May 2008 trade 
on all vintages). 
Of particular importance to agricultural businesses 
that desire to participate in the market is the role of 
aggregators. Aggregators are businesses that assemble 
many small providers of carbon offsets, then register, 
manage and sell those offsets on the market. Most agri-
cultural businesses that can provide offsets provide too 
few to actually market them on the CCX themselves. 
Additionally, The CCX requires that all traders be reg-
istered. Individuals can’t just enter the market at any 
time by themselves. In addition to providing access to 
the market for greenhouse gas reductions, aggregators 
comply with the rules for providing offsets. 
The CCX requires that a certain percentage of off-
set projects be verified by independent, third-party 
verifiers. Aggregators hire verifiers to select a sample 
of projects and investigate their compliance with the 
contracts. This verification activity provides assurance, 
or integrity, that the GHG credits being registered do 
in fact exist — that the market is truly reducing the 
amount of GHGs released into the environment.
When a GHG-emitting source voluntarily reduces 
emissions before the start of mandatory emissions 
reductions, they may accrue what are called “early 
action credits.” When mandatory reductions are 
enforced, a polluter could use these credits to meet its 
cap or to sell to other emitters trying to meet their caps. 
An example of an early action credit is when the CCX 
allows farmers who planted cropland to grass after 
1999 to receive credit for the carbon sequestered before 
actually signing on to provide credits.
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is 
another market-based effort to reduce GHG emissions 
in the 10 northeastern and mid-Atlantic states of Con-
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necticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island 
and Vermont. RGGI, unlike the CCX, establishes a man-
datory cap but the cap is only on electric power plants.
The RGGI target is to reduce CO2 emissions from 
electricity generation to 10 percent below their 2009 
emissions by the year 2018. Each state distributes 
allowances to electric companies in their state, up to 
the cap in effect for that particular year. A significant 
portion (100% in some states) of the allowances are dis-
tributed through an auction in which the electric com-
panies bid on allowances that they think they need or 
would like to control.
Offset allowances from nonregulated entities can 
be used by an electric company to meet its cap. The 
RGGI allows the electric company to use offset allow-
ances for 3.3 percent of its cap (10% under certain price 
situations). Offsets are permitted from the following 
agricultural projects: methane reduction, capture or 
destruction from manure management and carbon 
sequestration by afforestation. The RGGI does not per-
mit offsets from soil carbon sequestration, as does the 
CCX. Offset projects must take place in the 10 states of 
the RGGI except under special agreement.
The RGGI stresses “additionality” when accept-
ing offset projects. Additionality means that the GHG 
reductions from the offset project would not have 
occurred if the RGGI cap-and-trade system did not 
encourage it. Additionality seeks to have real and veri-
fiable emissions reductions. Soil carbon sequestration, 
an offset allowed by the CCX, does not normally meet 
strict criteria for additionality.
The RGGI auctions allowances quarterly. Data 
from the three auctions of 2009 allowances performed 
before April 2009 show a range of prices from $3.07 to 
$3.51 per ton of CO2. 
European Union Emission Trading System and 
European Climate Exchange
The European Union instituted a mandatory cap 
of greenhouse gas emissions on power generation and 
energy-intensive manufacturing in 2005 and proposes 
to cap aviation emissions beginning in 2011 or 2012. 
Their target is to reduce these emissions 20 percent 
below 1990 levels by 2020. Through the cap-and-trade 
mechanism, they expect that the quantity of emissions 
from regulated entities will be 21 percent below 2005 
levels by 2020 — short of their 20 percent of 1990 lev-
els by 2020. They have other goals such as improved 
energy efficiency and increased use of renewable 
energy that will help them meet their overall targets.
The EU currently is only limiting CO2 emissions 
rather than a range of GHG emissions as most U.S. mar-
kets trade. Furthermore, the EU trades are not based 
on calendar years but rather a period of years (the 
first period was 2005 through 2007) in order to smooth 
emission irregularities that might occur because of 
severe weather.
Those entities that are subject to a cap on emissions 
can trade emission allowances and credits through the 
European Climate Exchange (ECX). As of mid-June 
2009, the price of European Union Allowances (EUAs) 
has varied from 8.20 euros/metric ton of CO2 equiva-
lent (February 2009 trade on a December 2009 settle-
ment contract) to 37.78 euro/metric ton of CO2 equiva-
lent (January 2008 trade on December 2014 settlement 
contract). In U.S. dollars, this range is from $10.50 to 
$55.54 per metric ton.
EU trading allows no domestic offset providers 
but rather Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation projects. These projects are approved 
GHG mitigation projects in developing countries. They 
allow EU entities to invest in low-carbon technology 
in developing countries and receive credits for those 
reductions. 
When Europe instituted a GHG cap-and-trade 
system, it gave away most of the emission allowances 
and allowed individual nations to auction off a por-
tion of their allowances to emitting entities within their 
borders. Many analysts believe that too many of the 
allowances were freely distributed to emission sources 
and that this negatively affected the trading portion of 
the program. The Safe Climate Act of 2009 proposes 
the auction of most of the emissions allowances. 
Developing regional initiatives 
The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is an effort to 
investigate cooperative ways to reduce GHG emissions 
through a regional cap-and-trade system composed of 
the seven western U.S. states of Arizona, California, 
Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Washington 
and the four Canadian provinces of British Columbia, 
Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. Their goal is to reduce 
GHG emissions to 15 percent below 2005 levels by 
2020. According to their 2009–2010 Work Plan, they 
hope to fully implement a program by 2015. 
Their Work Plan indicates that the eventual reduc-
tions will be mandatory and cover 90 percent of the 
GHG emissions in the cooperating states and provinces. 
They are expecting to cap the emissions of many differ-
ent sources — from electricity generation to mining to 
pulp and paper manufacturing to gas combustion. 
They are anticipating the use of offsets in their cap-
and-trade system but have not yet determined the spe-
cifics. Their current proposal is that no more than 49 
percent of the reductions can occur through offsets.
Of particular importance to agriculture, the WCI 
(1) is not anticipating any caps on agricultural produc-
tion activities such as livestock waste, (2) is open to 
the idea of permitting offsets from soil sequestration, 
manure management, anaerobic digestion, rangeland 
management and afforestation, reforestation and for-
est management.
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Another regional initiative is the Midwestern 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord. It was signed by 
nine U.S. governors (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, South Dakota and Wis-
consin) and two Canadian premiers (Manitoba and 
Ontario) in November 2007. In the accord the gover-
nors and premiers resolved to create a GHG emissions 
reduction program in their states and provinces. Their 
plan is to institute caps on GHG emissions from mul-
tiple sources, allow trading of allowances, recognize 
early action credits and position themselves for inter-
action and integration into future federal programs.
Summary
Because CO2 is a global pollutant, it should not 
matter where reductions occur. This means that cross-
country trading should yield the same GHG reduc-
tion as in-country trading at the lowest price. A com-
pany that can lower its emissions at the lowest price 
will supply the credits regardless of where they save 
GHG emissions and where other companies buying 
their credits emit GHGs. With such trading, price dif-
ferences between markets such as the CCX and ECX 
should be minimal.
A quick look at the price of CO2 Eq. in the United 
States (ranging from $.71 to $7.41/metric ton on the 
CCX) and the price in the EU (ranging of $10.50 to 
$55.54/metric ton on the ECX) reveals the importance 
of the decisions made on the cap-and-trade system. 
Mandatory caps, as in the EU ETS, will raise the price 
of carbon. Limiting the supply of offsets, as the EU ETS 
does, will also exert upward pressure on the price of 
carbon. Both the CCX and EU ETS provide most (or all) 
of their allowances to emitting entities for free. This is 
likely to exert downward pressure on the price of car-
bon. U.S. plans to auction off all the allowances would 
most likely increase the price of carbon.
Agriculture is interested in participating in a cap-
and-trade system as an offset provider. Both the U.S. 
EPA Annual Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
and the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report suggest that 
agriculture has tremendous potential to mitigate GHG 
emissions. However, many environmentalists do not 
think that current agricultural offsets meet the stan-
dards of being additional, measurable, permanent 
and verifiable. The difference in opinion means that 
agriculture’s participation in a cap-and-trade system 
depends on the political process by which future GHG 
legislation is enacted.
For further information
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. This bill contains the 
provisions of what has been referred to in this guide as the Safe 
Climate Act of 2009. 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)  
Web site: chicagoclimateexchange.com
European Climate Exchange (ECX) 
Web site: www.exc.eu 
European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) 
Web site: ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en.htm
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report  
Web site: www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg3.htm
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)  
Web site: rggi.org/home
U.S. EPA Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 
Web site: epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport.html 
Western Climate Initiative (WCI)  
Web site: westernclimateinitiative.org
